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Moti Mizrahi has argued that Gettier cases are misleading, since they involve a 
certain kind of semantic failure. In a recent paper, I criticized Mizrahi’s argument. 
Mizrahi has since responded. This is a response to his response.1  
Mizrahi begins his response to me by mentioning some things that he finds 
peculiar about my critique. I said that Gettier’s original two cases are genuine 
counterexamples to the Justified True Belief analysis of knowledge (henceforth, 
the JTB analysis). And yet, in replying to Mizrahi’s original paper, I revised 
Gettier’s first case. Mizrahi asserts that if I needed to revise this case, then it is not 
a genuine counterexample. Otherwise why would I need to revise it? 
Let me explain how I understand this matter. Gettier cases standardly elicit 
the intuition that the relevant agent lacks knowledge even though the agent has a 
justified true belief. If this intuition is accurate, then Gettier cases are genuine 
counterexamples to the JTB analysis. And when I say that Gettier cases are 
genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis, I mean only that they are cases in 
which the relevant agent has a justified true belief and yet lacks knowledge. Now, 
Mizrahi tries to call into question the accuracy of the Gettier intuition by arguing 
that it may result, not from any epistemic failure, but rather from a certain kind of 
semantic failure. As Mizrahi put it in his original paper, we who have the 
intuition “may simply be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we 
                                                                
1 For the original Gettier cases, see Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” 
Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. For Mizrahi’s first paper, see “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” 
Logos & Episteme 7 (2016): 31-44. For my response, see “Are Gettier Cases Misleading?” Logos & 
Episteme 7 (2016): 379-384. For Mizrahi’s response to my response, see “Why Gettier Cases Are 
Still Misleading,” Logos & Episteme 8 (2017): 129-139. 
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consider Gettier cases.”2 If this alternative explanation of the Gettier intuition is 
correct, then the intuition should be absent when considering Gettier cases where 
it is clear that there is no such semantic failure. In my response to Mizrahi, I tried 
to provide such a case by simply tweaking one of Gettier’s original examples, and I 
then observed that, when considering this case, there remains the intuition that 
the relevant agent lacks knowledge. This means that Mizrahi’s alternative 
explanation of the Gettier intuition is incorrect. So, even though I revised Gettier’s 
first case in replying to Mizrahi, I continue to hold that it is a genuine 
counterexample to the JTB analysis. I find nothing peculiar about this position.3 
In his preliminary remarks, Mizrahi also says that I presented “a somewhat 
inaccurate picture of the state of the debate over the status of Gettier cases as a 
‘refutation’ of the JTB analysis of knowledge.”4 This is because, according to 
Mizrahi, “epistemologists have long recognized that Gettier’s original cases are 
problematic,”5 since these cases involve inferences from false premises, or “false 
lemmas.” I deny the charges. It is true that epistemologists have long recognized 
that Gettier’s original cases involve inferences from false lemmas. But it is 
misleading to say that these epistemologists took Gettier’s original cases to be 
“problematic,” for these epistemologists generally took Gettier to have been 
successful in refuting the JTB analysis. In light of Gettier’s counterexamples, some 
epistemologists were moved to argue that knowledge is actually justified true 
belief without false lemmas,6 while others claimed that even this theory succumbs 
                                                                
2 “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” 33. 
3 Consider an analogy. Suppose that someone tries to explain away my intuition by pointing to 
the fact that the relevant agent in Gettier’s case is named ‘Smith.’ Since I was recently dumped 
by someone named ‘Smith,’ I may be holding a grudge and for this reason I may be unwilling to 
ascribe knowledge to anyone named ‘Smith.’ To rebut this alternative explanation of my 
intuition, I need only revise the case so that the relevant agent is named something else, and 
then observe that the agent still seems to lack knowledge. And even though I have revised 
Gettier’s original case to rebut the alternative explanation, I can coherently hold that Gettier’s 
original case is itself a counterexample to the JTB analysis.  
4 “Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading,” 130. 
5 “Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading,” 129. 
6 Michael Clark “Knowledge and Grounds,” Analysis 24 (1963): 46-48. David Armstrong went 
further and suggested that one’s lemmas must not only be true, but known to be true. See his 
Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1974), 152-154. Both agree that 
Gettier’s original cases are counterexamples to the JTB analysis. I am aware of very few 
philosophers who have questioned whether Gettier’s original cases are genuine 
counterexamples. There is, for example, Joseph Margolis, “The Problem of Justified Belief,” 
Philosophical Studies 23 (1972): 405-409; and Meyers and Stern, “Knowledge Without Paradox,” 
Journal of Philosophy 52 (1973): 147-160. But, unlike Mizrahi, these philosophers readily accept 
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to Gettier-style counterexamples.7 Mizrahi questions why I would neglect to 
mention these things in my reply to him. The answer is that I was defending the 
claim that Gettier’s original cases refute the JTB analysis, not the claim that they 
refute the stronger theory that knowledge is justified true belief without false 
lemmas. To my knowledge, nobody has ever held that Gettier’s original cases 
refute this stronger theory and I am not sure why Mizrahi thinks that I should 
have discussed it.  
A note on terminology. Mizrahi thinks that “refutations” of theories are 
“conclusive proofs” that those theories are false. When I say that Gettier refuted 
the JTB analysis, I mean only that he provided counterexamples to the JTB 
analysis (that is, cases in which the relevant agent has a justified true belief and 
yet lacks knowledge). This seems somewhat different from saying that Gettier 
provided a “conclusive proof,” since it is always possible that someone will try to 
explain away our intuitions, which is exactly what Mizrahi tries to do to the 
Gettier intuition. I will gladly allow that this point is merely terminological. 
Whenever I say that Gettier refuted the JTB analysis, I can be understood to mean 
that Gettier’s original cases are counterexamples to the JTB analysis. However, 
there are more substantive differences between Mizrahi and me. He is generally 
skeptical of appeals to intuitions. In fact, he accuses me of “mere intuition 
mongering,” though it is not clear to me exactly what he means.8 My own modest 
view is that one’s intuitions count as good evidence for or against philosophical 
theories, but they are also defeasible, as all forms of evidence are defeasible. 
Various things might undermine the evidential weight of an intuition, such as the 
fact that many others lack the intuition, or a plausible alternative account of why 
one has the intuition. As I have made clear, I think that Mizrahi’s alternative 
account of the Gettier intuition, whereby it results from some mistake that we are 
making regarding epistemic facts and semantics facts, does not successfully explain 
the Gettier intuition. And, though I am sure that there are those who do not have 
                                                                                                                                       
that the agents in Gettier’s cases lack knowledge. Instead, they deny that the agents have formed 
justified beliefs. Suffice it to say, this position has never been popular. 
7 See, for example, Ernest Sosa, “The Analysis of ‘Knowledge That P’,” Analysis 25 (1964): 1-8; 
John Turk Saunders and Narayan Champawat, “Mr. Clark’s Definition of ‘Knowledge’,” Analysis 
25 (1964), 8-9; Richard Feldman Epistemology (Prentice Hall, 2003), 31-33. Of course, the 
debate continues. For a relatively recent discussion, see Michael Levin “Gettier Cases Without 
False Lemmas?” Erkenntnis 64 (2006): 381-391. 
8 Mizrahi discusses the topic in “Intuition Mongering,” The Reasoner 6 (2012): 169-170; and also 
“More Intuition Mongering,” The Reasoner 7 (2013): 5-6. He does not provide a definition of 
‘intuition mongering,’ so I am left to conclude that he means nothing more than ‘relying on our 
intuitions,’ or alternatively ‘relying on how things seem to us.’  
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the Gettier intuition, recent empirical research indicates that it is widely shared 
across cultures.9  
Speaking of empirical research, though Mizrahi does not emphasize 
experimental philosophy in his original paper, he mentions it in his reply to me as 
evidence that appeals to intuition are “rather controversial.”10 This despite the fact 
that recent research indicates that the Gettier intuition is remarkably pervasive, as 
I mentioned above. In any event, Mizrahi is free to argue against Gettier on the 
general grounds that philosophical intuitions are unreliable, as suggested, perhaps, 
by empirical research. But this is not the main argument that he made in his 
original paper, which was much narrower, and which was the argument that I 
wanted to rebut. As Mizrahi himself wrote, the main argument of that paper did 
“not depend on experimental results concerning Gettier intuitions.”11 
Before discussing the details of Gettier’s original cases, there is one more 
preliminary point worth discussing. Mizrahi claims that I denied that Gettier’s 
original cases involve ambiguous designators. Though I do not believe that 
ambiguous designators are responsible for the Gettier intuition, I never denied 
that Gettier’s original cases involve ambiguous designators. Indeed, I purposefully 
avoided using the expression ‘ambiguous designator’ in my initial reply to Mizrahi. 
This is because I felt that Mizrahi was using the term in an idiosyncratic way. In 
fact, though Mizrahi relies on Saul Kripke’s distinction between semantic 
reference and speaker’s reference,12 Mizrahi uses ‘ambiguous designator’ in a way 
that Kripke would not. Remember that Kripke was concerned with the claim that 
definite descriptions, such as ‘the man drinking champagne,’ are ambiguous, since 
they can be used attributively or referentially.13 Kripke denies that ‘the man 
drinking champagne’ is ambiguous, at least in the way that ‘bank’ is ambiguous.14 
He argues that the distinction between attributive use and referential use is an 
instance of a more general distinction, between semantic reference and speaker’s 
                                                                
9 Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel 
Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui, and Takaaki Hashimoto, “Gettier Across Cultures” Noûs 
(forthcoming). 
10 “Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading,” 131. 
11 “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” 32, fn. 4. 
12 Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 
(1977): 255-276. 
13 Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” The Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 
281-304. 
14 In general, Kripke is wary of invoking ambiguities in philosophical debates. He writes, “It is 
very much the lazy man’s approach in philosophy to posit ambiguities when in trouble,” 268. 
Thanks to Matt Griffin for discussing this point with me. 
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reference. This distinction applies even to proper names, such as ‘Barack Obama.’ 
The semantic referent of the name is Barack Obama, the former president, but the 
speaker’s referent, on a certain occasion of use, might be someone else entirely. 
And yet, even if there is a divergence between semantic reference and speaker’s 
reference, it would be inappropriate to conclude that ‘Barack Obama’ is 
ambiguous. This, anyway, is Kripke’s contention. Mizrahi would say, apparently, 
that the proper name is ambiguous, since he thinks that divergences between 
semantic reference and speaker’s reference are indicative of ambiguous 
designators.  
I side with Kripke in thinking that ‘Barack Obama’ is unambiguous. After 
all, if we say that ‘Barack Obama’ is ambiguous, then we will have to say that 
every singular expression is ambiguous, at least potentially, since every singular 
expression admits of divergences between speaker’s reference and semantic 
reference. I am not willing to countenance such an explosion of ambiguities.15 
Ultimately, however, I am inclined to think that the matter is not of central 
importance. Mizrahi’s main argument can be stated without explicitly mentioning 
ambiguous designators. That argument is that Gettier cases involve a certain kind 
of semantic failure, where the semantic referent of a term is different from the 
speaker’s referent, and that this semantic failure is plausibly responsible for our 
intuitions regarding Gettier cases. So, according to Mizrahi, those cases are 
misleading. 
Now, let us consider more closely Gettier’s first case. Smith comes to have 
strong evidence for believing that Jones is the man who will get the job and that 
Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith then infers  
(I) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.  
This is true, not because Jones has ten coins in his pocket, but because Smith has 
ten coins in his pocket and Smith happens to be the man who will get the job. 
Mizrahi argued in his original paper that ‘coins’ is an ambiguous designator, since 
the speaker’s referent is the set of coins in Jones’s pocket, which is not the 
semantic referent of ‘coins.’ I argued that, even if there is a difference here 
between the speaker’s referent and the semantic referent, it does not plausibly 
account for the intuition that Smith lacks knowledge. For the case can be easily 
revised so that Smith instead comes to infer 
(I*) The man who will get the job is handsome. 
                                                                
15 I imagine that Mizrahi would be fine with this explosion of ambiguities. In fact, as we will see, 
Mizrahi is willing to say that even complex quantificational expressions, such as ‘there is 
someone who,’ are ambiguous. 
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It seems that Smith fails to know (I*), and yet it is unreasonable to insist that 
there is a divergence between the speaker’s referent of ‘handsome’ and the 
semantic referent of ‘handsome.’ I considered the possibility that ‘the man who 
will get the job’ is such that there is a divergence between the speaker’s referent 
and the semantic referent. Even though Mizrahi did not focus on the definite 
description, and would not be the first to argue that there is a divergence there 
between speaker’s reference and semantic reference,16 I noted that the case can 
again be revised so that Smith infers 
(I**) There is someone who is getting a job and handsome. 
Intuitively, Smith fails to know (I**), and yet there is no definite description 
whatsoever.17 So, even if Gettier’s first case involves an ambiguous designator, in 
Mizrahi’s special sense, this fact would not successfully explain away our intuition 
about the case. 
In Mizrahi’s response to me, he does not share his intuitive judgment of 
these cases. He does suggest that the intuition that Smith lacks knowledge results 
from my having been taught that this intuition is the “right” one. It is not clear to 
me how to respond to such speculation, except to say that, upon serious reflection, 
I still judge that Smith lacks knowledge in these cases (I am quite capable of 
thinking for myself). Mizrahi also suggests that the intuition results from the fact 
that these cases involve false lemmas. Indeed, this is a plausible account of the 
intuition, insofar as it is a plausible account of why Smith lacks knowledge in 
these cases. In other words, it is plausible that knowledge requires more than 
justified true belief. Perhaps it requires the absence of false lemmas.18 But Gettier 
never argued otherwise. To repeat what I said above, I am not aware of anyone 
                                                                
16 Mizrahi himself cited Adrian Heathcote “Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem,” in Aspects 
of Knowing: Epistemological Essays, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006), 151-
168; and also Christoph Schmidt-Petri “Is Gettier’s First Examples Flawed?” in Knowledge and 
Belief, eds. Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner (Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS, 2003), 317-
319. 
17 I should have mentioned in my earlier paper that this version of Gettier’s case is basically the 
same as Keith Lehrer’s Nogot/Havit case. In that case, I have strong evidence for believing that 
Mr. Nogot, who is in my office, owns a Ford. I then infer that someone in my office owns a 
Ford. It turns out that someone in my office does own a Ford, but, unbeknownst to me, it is Mr. 
Havit rather than Mr. Nogot. Here I have a justified true belief that someone in my office owns 
a Ford, but this belief does not count as knowledge. See “Knowledge, Truth and Evidence,” 
Analysis 25 (1965): 168-175. Lehrer’s case is probably cleaner than mine, since mine requires 
some minor qualifications regarding the claim that Smith fails to know (I**). See fn. 9 of “Are 
Gettier Cases Misleading?” 
18 See fn. 6 above. 
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who has thought that Gettier’s original cases refute the theory that knowledge is 
justified true belief without false lemmas. What epistemologists have standardly 
held is that Gettier’s original cases refute the theory that knowledge is justified 
true belief. This is the position I want to defend against Mizrahi. The stronger 
theory of knowledge, whereby knowledge requires the absence of false lemmas, is 
irrelevant here.  
Mizrahi proceeds to say that ‘someone,’ or more fully ‘there is someone 
who,’ is ambiguous in (I**). He thinks that the semantic referent is Smith, while 
the speaker’s referent is Jones. It is odd to suggest that the semantic referent of the 
complex quantificational expression ‘there is someone who’ is one particular man, 
but set that issue aside. Mizrahi’s main point is that the content of Smith’s belief 
can be interpreted in two ways.  
1. There is someone (=Smith) who is getting a job and handsome. 
2. There is someone (=Jones) who is getting a job and handsome. 
Mizahi notes that (2) is false and (1) is not believed by Smith. But neither (1) nor 
(2) is the relevant interpretation of what Smith believes after inferring (I**). The 
content of Smith’s belief is, quite simply, the general proposition that there is 
someone who is getting a job and handsome, not the singular proposition that 
there is someone, specifically Smith, who is getting a job and handsome, nor the 
singular proposition that there is someone, specifically Jones, who is getting a job 
and handsome.19 The question is whether that belief, whose content includes 
neither Smith nor Jones, counts as knowledge. Intuitively, the answer is that it 
does not. Mizrahi might insist that Smith does not actually believe the fully 
general proposition that there is someone who is getting a job and handsome, but 
this maneuver would be desperate. Why should Smith be cognitively unable to 
form such a rudimentary belief?  
Mizrahi makes one other curious claim about my revision of Gettier’s first 
case. He thinks that Smith must be reasoning as follows: 
a. Jones is getting the job. 
b. Therefore, there is someone who is getting the job. 
c. Jones is handsome. 
d. Therefore, there is someone who is handsome. 
                                                                
19 Similarly, in the Nogot/Havit case, the content of my belief is understood to be the general 
proposition that someone in my office owns a Ford, not the proposition that someone in my 
office, specifically Nogot, owns a Ford. See fn. 17 above.  
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e. Therefore, there is someone who is getting the job and there is someone who is 
handsome. 
Mizrahi asserts that “Smith’s evidence supports (e), not the belief that the one who 
will get the job and the one who is handsome are one and the same person.”20 But 
these remarks are incorrect. To be as explicit as possible, Smith is actually 
reasoning as follows: 
a*. Jones is getting the job. 
b*. Jones is handsome. 
c*. Therefore, Jones is getting the job and handsome. 
d.* Therefore, there is someone who is getting the job and handsome.  
Formally, Smith’s line of reasoning could be spelled out as follows: 
Gj 
Hj 
 Gj  Hj 
 x[Gx  Hx]. 
Now, it is stipulated that Jones has strong evidence for believing both (a*) and (b*). 
From (a*) and (b*) he infers (c*), and from (c*) he infers (d*). Each inference is valid 
and (d*) clearly entails that the one who is getting the job and the one who is 
handsome are identical.  
As for Gettier’s second case, I observed in my initial reply that Mizrahi 
misinterpreted it, which undermined his case for semantic failure. In that case, 
Smith has strong evidence for believing that Jones owns a Ford. His evidence is 
that “Jones has at all time in the past owned a car, and always a Ford, and that 
Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford.”21 Smith makes a 
rudimentary logical inference and says the following: 
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. 
It turns out that (h) is true, not because Jones owns a Ford, but because Brown is 
in Barcelona. Mizrahi presented the case so that Smith infers (h) from 
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston, 
which was inferred from 
(f) Jones owns a Ford. 
                                                                
20 “Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading,” 135. 
21 “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” 122. 
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In fact, Smith infers both (g) and (h) directly from (f). Moreover, Mizrahi 
presented the case, incorrectly, as involving two separate men, one of whom is the 
speaker’s referent of ‘Jones’ and one of whom is the semantic referent of ‘Jones.’ As 
far as I can tell, Mizrahi does not address these mistakes in his reply to me. He 
does, however, accuse me of failing to get Gettier right. In his reply, he presents 
Smith’s reasoning as follows:  
i. Smith has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a car. 
ii. Smith has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a Ford. 
iii. Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. 
iv. Therefore, Jones owns a Ford. 
v. Therefore, either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. 
Mizrahi then writes: “Contrary to what Atkins suggests, Smith cannot 
simply make ‘a rudimentary logical inference’ from (i)-(iii) to (v), since (v) does 
not follow from (i)-(iii). Rather, (i)-(iii) are evidence for (iv), and then Smith 
infers (v) from (iv) by a ‘rudimentary logical inference,’ namely, addition.”22 Well, 
I agree that (i)-(iii) are Smith’s evidence for (iv) and that Smith, after concluding 
that (iv) is true, infers (v) from (iv). However, I did not say otherwise. As for 
whether I “suggested” otherwise, I will have to let the reader decide. My 
presentation of Gettier’s case was essentially the same as the presentation that I 
give above. 
I have little space to discuss the other things that Mizrahi says about 
Gettier’s second case, so I will only make a few brief points. While reflecting on 
the nature of time, Mizrahi observes that a child could not correctly reason as 
follows: 
Barack Obama has at all times in the past within my memory been the US 
president. 
Therefore, Barack Obama is the US president at present (where the present time 
is January 21, 2017). 
“The problem,” according to Mizrahi, “is that ‘Barack Obama’ is referentially 
ambiguous in this context.”23 Philosophers of language would tend to disagree. 
The problem is not the proper name, but rather the definite description ‘the US 
president,’ which designates different individuals with respect to different times. 
Regardless, Mizrahi proceeds to argue that ‘Jones’ is also referentially ambiguous: 
                                                                
22 “Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading,” 136. 
23 “Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading,” 137. 
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“the reference of ‘Jones’ in (i)-(iii) was fixed at some particular time in the past, 
since (i)-(iii) are based on what Smith remembers about Jones, whereas ‘Jones’ in 
(iv) is supposed to pick out the present Ford owner. This switch in reference… 
makes Gettier’s Case II appear like a genuine counterexample to JTB, even though 
it is not.”24  
So, ‘Jones’ supposedly undergoes a shift in reference, designating one 
individual and then later designating a different individual. Who specifically are 
these individuals? The initial referent must be Jones, the man whom Smith 
remembers as having owned a Ford. But who is the other individual? Mizrahi 
suggests that it is “the present Ford owner.” But if ‘Jones’ designates a Ford owner 
in (iv), then (iv) would be true, whereas in fact (iv) is stipulated to be false. 
Perhaps it is the case that ‘Jones’ initially designates past Jones and then comes to 
designate present Jones. This is perhaps why Mizrahi writes in his conclusion that 
“Smith has past Jones in mind, for Smith’s evidence is about past Jones, not about 
present Jones.”25 At the risk of wading into murky metaphysical waters, I submit 
that Smith has both past Jones and present Jones in mind, and that his evidence is 
about both past Jones and present Jones, seeing as how past Jones and present 
Jones are the same person. And if we agree that there is only one individual here, 
not two separate individuals, then we cannot coherently say that there is a switch 
in reference.  
In any event, Mizrahi’s alternative explanation of the Gettier intuition falls 
apart if we simply imagine that Jones is currently in the company of Smith. 
Instead of thinking (iv), based on memory, he comes to the following conclusion, 
based on direct perception: 
(iv*) Jones is standing in front of me. 
And then, from (iv*), Smith validly infers  
(v*) Either Jones is standing in front of me or Brown is in Barcelona. 
Of course, (iv*) is false. Jones is standing behind Smith, but appears to be standing 
in front of Smith due to some cleverly placed mirrors. Nonetheless, by sheer 
coincidence, Brown is in Barcelona and so (v*) is true. Surely anyone who agreed 
with Gettier’s conclusion regarding (v) will come to the same conclusion 
regarding (v*). Specifically, they will come to the conclusion that Smith fails to 
know (v*), even though Smith is justified in believing (v*) and it turns out that (v*) 
is true. And yet here there can be no quibbles about past Jones and present Jones. 
                                                                
24 “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” 138. 
25 Ibid.  
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There can be no talk of ‘Jones’ somehow changing its reference over time. It 
stands to reason that the considerations adduced by Mizrahi are not responsible 
for our intuitions about Gettier’s second case. A much better account of our 
intuitions would be that knowledge is not justified true belief. 
